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The growing demand for gas, supply interruptions, increasing gas prices, transportation 
and distribution bottlenecks, and a growing reliance on imports over longer distances 
have rekindled a debate on gas security of supply. Natural gas has become an 
increasingly valuable resource. Its consumption is expected to increase into the future 
because of its low environmental impact, ease of use and an increase in the number of 
natural gas-fired power plants. It is one of the fuels that drive the economy. The demand 
for it, as a replacement for more expensive, less environmentally-friendly and less 
efficient resources, has already significantly increased (Cabalu and Manhutu, 2009). 
 
The world is dependent on natural gas for power generation. In 2008, it fulfilled more 
than 24 per cent of the total global primary energy demand (BP, 2009). OECD countries 
accounted for 50 per cent of gas use, transition economies, especially Russia, used about 
20 per cent with developing countries accounting for the rest. Natural gas is forecast to be 
the fastest growing energy source by 2025, with global consumption rising by almost 60 
per cent from 99 trillion cubic feet to 156 trillion cubic feet. The emerging markets of 
Asia will be the centre of this growth where gas consumption is projected to triple by 
2025 (EIA, 2005).  
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The imbalances between supply and demand drive international trade in natural gas. On 
the one hand are northeast Asian countries (i.e. Japan, Korea, Taiwan and China), which 
hold just over 1 per cent of world’s reserves but account for almost 8 per cent of the 
demand. On the other hand, the Middle East (particularly Iran and Qatar) and Russia have 
two-thirds of the world’s reserves and account for around 25 per cent of the demand in 
2008 (BP, 2009).  
 
Natural gas is also becoming an increasingly global commodity. In the past, gas has 
tended to be used in the region where it is produced because of the relatively high 
transport costs. However, technical developments have led to a drastic reduction in gas 
liquefaction and transport costs making liquefied natural gas (LNG) competitive with 
traditional pipeline gas. The rapid growth in LNG use and its greater flexibility has 
started to create a global market for gas. In 2008, approximately 27 per cent of the global 
natural gas supply was internationally traded with LNG shipments showing strong 
growth, well above the ten-year average and making up more than 28 per cent of total 
export volume (BP, 2009). The remaining share of gas sold on the world energy market is 
distributed via gas pipelines. 
 
In 2008, about 11 per cent of the Asia-Pacific primary energy consumption was based on 
natural gas. Gas market requirements are mostly met through imports, 90 per cent of 
which is LNG from Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Australia and the Middle East. Japan 
and Korea are almost entirely dependent on LNG imports for their gas supplies. In Japan 
and Korea, imported gas exchanges are based on long term contracts of 20 to 25 years 
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and indexation clauses where the gas price is directly linked to the price of crude oil, 
including relatively strict clauses such as take-or-pay clauses which require importers to 
pay for the gas even if their deliveries are interrupted. In Australia and New Zealand, 
prices are set by gas-on-gas or gas-on-coal competition (IAEE, 2007; IEA, 2007; BP 
2009). 
 
Short-term security of gas supply is the availability of gas supply despite exceptional 
demand and difficult supply conditions including disruptions to supply due to physical or 
economic factors. Physical disruptions can occur when gas supply is exhausted or gas 
production is stopped. Economic disruptions can be caused by dramatic gas price 
fluctuations which in turn, are due to physical disruptions or unanticipated price changes 
associated with speculative reaction to potential disruption.  
 
Long-term security of gas supply on the other hand, is the ability to ensure that future gas 
demand can be met by a combination of domestic and imported gas supplies. Disruptions 
to long term security of supply are caused by inadequate investments in production and 
transmission infrastructure, lack of supply diversity and risks associated with import 
dependency which are geopolitical in nature. Gas-importing countries have started to 
examine available responses to disruptions to ensure security of gas supply (Dolader, 
2003; Costantini, et al., 2007). 
 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate a set of gas supply security indicators including 
gas intensity, net gas import dependency, ratio of domestic gas production to total 
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domestic gas consumption and geopolitical risk for seven gas-importing countries in Asia 
for the year 2008. It proposes a composite gas supply security index (GSSI) that is 
derived as the root mean square of the scaled values of four security of gas supply 
indicators (Gnansounou, 2008). The four security of gas supply indicators are interrelated 
and that the GSSI derived provides a composite quantitative measure of gas security by 
taking into account the interactions and interdependence between the identified set of 
indicators. The GSSI captures the sensitivity of the Asian economies to developments in 
the international gas market, with a higher index indicating higher gas supply insecurity 
or vulnerability. The existing literature does not identify a unique methodology to assess 
and quantify energy security that is factual, objective, unbiased, transparent and 
accessible. This paper, however, is important in terms of providing metrics by evaluating 
a set of parameters and indicators to assess overall natural gas supply security in seven 
Asian economies. It is important for future policy making to benchmark countries against 
quantified indicators and assess their gas security of supply weakness. 
 
The seven net gas-importing countries included in this study are Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
China, India, Singapore and Thailand, which together account for more than 75 per cent 
of the total gas consumption in the Asia–Pacific in 2008 (BP, 2009). The paper proceeds 
as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature on energy supply security, particularly 
focused on identifying the various indicators used in the literature to indicate energy 
vulnerability. Section 3 proposes and derives a composite gas supply security index and 
Section 4 evalua4tes this index for the seven countries in our sample and presents our 
results and analysis. The final section concludes. 
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2.  Review of existing literature on energy security and its indicators 
 
To date, the literature on assessing energy security has concentrated on oil and mostly on 
industrialised countries. A number of studies have tried to develop a set of energy supply 
security indicators to account for both short- and long-term disruptions. Although a 
number of indicators have been proposed in the literature, there is no consensus on a set 
of relevant indicators. As a result, time series data to directly assess trends in energy 
supply security are not readily available and policymakers have therefore relied on a 
number of parameters associated with energy security to inform decision making. 
 
Jansen, et. al. (2004) studied the energy supply security issue in the European Union by 
constructing four long-term energy security indicators based on the Shannon diversity 
index applied to eight primary energy supply sources (coal, oil, gas, modern and 
traditional biofuels, nuclear, renewables and hydropower). The indicators accounted for 
supply security aspects such as diversification of energy sources in energy supply, 
diversification of imports with respect to imported energy sources, political stability in 
import sources, and the resource base in import sources. 
 
Similarly, Costantini, et. al. (2007) grouped indicators of supply security into two 
categories: dependence and vulnerability represented in physical and economic terms. 
The distinction between dependence and vulnerability was made and in their study, the 
physical dimension of dependence was represented with indicators such as percentage 
share of net import of oil and gas in total primary energy supply and share of European 
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oil and gas imports in world oil and gas imports while the physical dimension of 
vulnerability was calculated in terms of degree of supply concentration in trade and 
production using the Shannon-Weiner diversity index, percentage share of oil used in 
transportation, and percentage share of electricity produced with gas. In terms of the 
economic dimension of dependence and vulnerability, the value of oil and gas imports 
and oil and gas consumption per dollar of GDP respectively, were estimated. These 
indicators of the European energy system were analysed under different energy scenarios.  
 
In a study by de Jong, et. al. (2007), a model was developed for reviewing and assessing 
energy supply security in the European Union, on the basis of pre-agreed criteria. It used 
two quantitative indicators and some qualitative considerations. The first quantitative 
indicator, the Crisis Capability (CC) Index dealt with the risk of sudden unforseen short-
term supply interruptions and the capability to manage them. The second indicator, the 
Supply/Demand (S/D) Index covered present and future energy supply and demand 
balances. Qualitative considerations included multilateral measures for securing overall 
producer/consumer relations and safeguarding vulnerable transport routes for oil and gas.  
 
A number of studies have focused on assessing energy vulnerability. Kendell (1998) 
explored the meaning and value of measures of import vulnerability as indicators of 
energy security, in particular, oil security in the United States. While measures of oil 
import dependence showing the extent of a country’s imports may be of interest, they 
offer a limited indication of energy security. Gupta (2008), APERC (2007), UNDP 
(2007) have also examined the relative oil vulnerability of oil-importing countries on the 
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basis of various factors. Using principal component technique, individual indicators such 
as domestic oil reserves relative to total oil consumption, geopolitical oil risk, oil 
intensity, cost of oil in national income and ratio of oil consumption in total primary 
energy consumption were combined into a composite index of oil vulnerability. Percebois 
(2007) clarified the distinction between vulnerability and energy dependence and 
presented a coherent set of indicators including import concentration, level of energy 
import value in output, risk of blackout in the electricity sector, price volatility, exchange 
rates, and industrial and technological factors that are used to analyse energy 
vulnerability. Gnansounou (2008) defined a composite index of energy demand/supply 
weaknesses as a proxy of energy vulnerability. The index is based on several indicators 
such as energy intensity, oil and gas import dependency, CO2 content of primary energy 
supply, electricity supply weaknesses and non-diversity in transport fuels. The 
assessment of the composite index was applied on selected industrialised countries. In 
2008, the World Energy Council (2008) identified threats to the European economy 
which could lead to potential energy crises and suggested solutions for facing related key 
challenges. The study also developed a number of indicators to assess the level of 
different types of vulnerability, as well as the overall vulnerability of a country or region, 
including threats to physical disruption and higher energy prices. 
 
The design of a composite index of energy security has been undertaken in previous 
studies. A composite vulnerability index was developed by the World Energy Council 
(2008) to benchmark and monitor European countries’ respective efforts to cope with 
long-term energy vulnerability. Similarly, de Jong, et. al. (2007) designed state-of-the-art 
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indexes of energy security risk (ie., the Crisis Capability Index and Supply/Demand 
Index) which are oriented towards a comprehensive and analytical representation of the 
energy supply chain. However, the shortcoming of these approaches was the use of 
subjective-opinion-dominated weighting systems and scoring rules where the weights and 
the rules were based on expert judgements. In response to this shortcoming, Gnansounou 
(2008) proposed an alternative method which was objective-value-oriented and statistics-
based. Gnansounou defined the composite index as the Euclidean distance to the best 
energy security case represented by the zero point. The Euclidean distance is standardised 
in order to get a value between 0 and 1. 
 
3. Constructing the GSSI for the Asian gas market 
 
The oil shocks in the 1970s demonstrated how vulnerable the world’s economy was to 
supply interruptions and price volatility. Any energy infrastructure, oil, coal or natural 
gas, is often vulnerable to disruption by insufficient supply, accident or malice. 
Terrorism, technical mishap, or natural disasters that damage the energy system could be 
nearly as devastating as a sizeable war. Inadequate financial resources also increase 
vulnerability or insecurity by limiting supply, transmission, and reliability while 
increasing prices of energy imports adversely affect the macroeconomic balance of 
payments, contribute inflationary pressures, and displace other consumption and 
investment because short-term demand is inelastic. In the past, long term contracts 
between exporters and importers are an important element of security of supply (Czernie, 
2002). However, in the last several years long terms contracts are not adequate assurance 
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of uninterrupted deliveries. There has been a strong trend towards shorter contract terms 
or a considerable decrease in the length of natural gas contracts caused by either market-
related or regulatory-related changes. Market changes due to federal regulatory initiatives 
and the creation of competitive markets in natural gas and transmission have led to this 
trend (Petrash, 2006). 
 
In line with the analyses made in previous literature, four distinct security of supply 
indicators were selected for this study: gas intensity (G1), net gas import dependency 
(G2), ratio of domestic gas production to total domestic gas consumption (G3) and 
geopolitical risk (G4). G1 is measured as the ratio of gas consumed in an economy to 
gross domestic product (GDP). It is the amount of natural gas needed to produce a 
dollar's worth of goods and services and provides an indication of efficient use of gas to 
produce the economy’s output. G2 is expressed as the ratio of net imported gas 
consumption to total primary energy consumption. G3 is measured as the ratio of 
domestic gas production to total domestic gas consumption. Domestic production is a 
better indicator of the country’s capacity to cope with short–term supply disruption than 
domestic reserves as production excludes gas from stranded reserves which cannot be 
tapped immediately. G4 represents the exposure of an economy to political risk and is 
measured on the basis of two factors: diversification of gas import sources and political 
stability in gas-exporting countries. The details of the method of calculation of these 
indicators are provided in the Appendix. Appendix Table 1 presents estimates of the four 
security of supply indicators of seven net gas importing countries in Asia.  
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High gas intensity of GDP results in larger adjustments costs and impacts on gas supply 
security in the event of natural gas supply shocks. In addition, the higher the share of 
imported gas in total energy demand the more vulnerable an economy is to international 
gas developments. Diversification of supply sources, particularly politically stable supply 
sources also reduces the risk and vulnerability to disruption. Dependence on 
domestically-sourced gas supply is preferred over imported gas, as it avoids geopolitical 
uncertainties. In addition, the larger domestic gas reserves relative to consumption or the 
larger domestic production capabilities a country has, the lesser are the likely impacts on 
gas security.  
 
It is difficult to quantify a country’s overall gas supply security using individual 
indicators and it is even more difficult to synthesise different indicators. To facilitate 
comparison or aggregation of several indicators, it may be better for these to be expressed 
in the same units. To do this, for each of the four security indicators, a relative 
indicator iϕ , was estimated which was used to compute a composite index — gas supply 
security index (GSSI). The relative indicators were estimated by using a scaling 
technique where the minimum value is set to 0 and the maximum to 1. The value of 0 is 
assigned to the country with the least vulnerability or insecurity to supply disruptions and 
the value 1 is assigned to the country with the most vulnerability to supply shocks. Table 
1 presents calculations for the relative indicators which are scaled values of the four 






Table 1.  Relative indicators of security of supply in selected net gas importing countries 
in Asia, 2008 (arranged in ascending order of vulnerability/insecurity) 
1ϕ  2ϕ  3ϕ  4ϕ  
China                  0.000 China                   0.000 China                   0.000 Japan                   0.000 
Japan                   0.008 India                    0.126 Thailand              0.181 Korea                  0.200 
Taiwan                0.126 Thailand              0.533 India                    0.213 India                    0.535 
India                    0.134 Taiwan                0.589 Japan                   0.970 Taiwan                0.626 
Korea                  0.202 Korea                  0.836 Korea                  1.000 China                  0.788 
Singapore            0.277 Singapore            0.780 Singapore            1.000 Singapore            0.848 
Thailand              1.000 Japan                   1.000 Taiwan                1.000 Thailand              1.000 
AVERAGE         0.249 AVERAGE         0.552 AVERAGE         0.628 AVERAGE         0.571 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: 1ϕ  is the relative indicator or scaled value for G1 (gas intensity); 2ϕ  is the relative indicator or scaled value for 
G2 (net gas import dependency); 3ϕ  is the relative indicator or scaled value for G3 (ratio of domestic gas production to 
total domestic gas consumption); 4ϕ  is the relative indicator or scaled value for G4 (geopolitical risk). 
 
Following Gnansounou (2008), the gas supply security index (GSSI) is derived as the 










The various relative indicators of gas security are interrelated and that the GSSI derived 
provides a composite quantitative measure of gas security by taking into account the 
interactions and interdependence between the identified set of indicators. The GSSI 
captures the sensitivity of the Asian economies to developments in the international gas 





4.  Empirical results 
 
In this paper, the GSSI was estimated for seven Asian net gas-importing economies of 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, India, Singapore and Thailand for 2008. The final values of 
GSSI for our sample net gas-importing countries in Asia are shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Gas security of supply index of selected net gas-importing countries in Asia 
(2008) 
 
Source: Based on author’s calculations 
 
In our sample, India is least vulnerable in the event of a natural gas supply disruption. It 
registered the lowest GSSI at 0.302. The strength of this country is on G2 indicating a 
relatively low gas import dependency, and to a less extent on G1 for having low gas 
intensity. In India, natural gas is a minor fuel in the overall energy mix representing only 
8.6 per cent of total primary energy consumption in 2008. In that same year, India’s 









natural gas imports represent just over 2 per cent of its energy mix and hence not reliant 
on imports. With coal as the major source of energy for power generation, gas intensity 
of the economy’s GDP is low. However, India’s consumption of natural gas has risen 
faster than any other fuel. The power and fertiliser industries are the key demand drivers 
for natural gas. With domestic gas production only large enough to satisfy almost three-
quarters of its domestic gas consumption, India’s domestic natural gas supply is not likely 
to keep pace with demand. Despite major new natural gas discoveries in recent years, the 
country will have to import more, either via pipeline or as LNG. With an increase in the 
demand and supply for natural gas and with multiple new players entering the market, the 
Indian government’s Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act of 2006 has 
promoted competition among market players and stabilised natural gas supply (Thacker, 
2006).  
 
The bulk of India’s natural gas production comes from the western offshore regions, 
especially the Mumbai High basin. The onshore fields in Assam, Andhra Pradesh, and 
Gujarat states are also major producers of natural gas. In 2008, around 26 per cent of 
supply came from imported LNG. Currently, there are two regasification terminals 
located on the Western coast of India, Dahej and Hazira. The Dahej terminal is being 
supplied from Qatar under a long term contract, supplemented by spot cargoes from other 
sources. A possible source of supply for Hazira terminal is Australia’s Gorgon LNG 
project. By 2010, India intends to have two more import terminals, Dabhol — Ratnagiri 
and Kochi. A contractual agreement on the pricing formula for gas has been signed and 
plans to import gas through the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline have progressed. Other 
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possible sources of imported gas are Bangladesh and Myanmar. The natural gas reserves 
of Bangladesh could be linked into the Indian gas grid while new natural gas find in 
Myanmar could be supplied via pipeline running across Bangladeshi territory to West 
Bengal in India provided agreement could be reached among parties concerned (EIA, 
2008).  
 
China ranked 2nd as less gas-vulnerable country in the sample. China’s major strengths 
are on G1, G2 and G3. Its only weakness is on G4. China is rich in energy resources, 
particularly coal. Natural gas consumption in China is significantly less than other fossil 
fuels. Natural gas generally occupies a very small share (3.6 per cent in 2008) in China’s 
energy mix and use of domestic gas production is limited to areas near production sites 
such as in Sichuan, Liaoning and Heilongjiang Provinces, where low cost gas is possible. 
Despite an almost 10 per cent increase in domestic production of natural gas in 2008, coal 
and oil resources were utilised more extensively than natural gas for power generation 
and industrial development purposes. Natural gas is primarily used as a feed stock for 
chemical fertiliser and to operate oil and gas fields. China’s major gas fields are located 
in the western part of the country, making transport to eastern demand centres difficult. 
Gas use in China is still small but is expected to double by 2030 (Komiyama, et.al., 2005; 
APERC, 2008). This growth will be driven mainly by the increased use of gas for power 
generation and increased residential consumption in urban areas. While some of the 
rising demand will be fulfilled through increases in domestic production, a large portion 
will come from pipeline and LNG imports. Due to geographical accessibility, the small 
amount of imported LNG goes to southern provinces along the coast like Guangdong and 
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Fujian. The International Energy Agency (2002) notes that obstacles to the development 
of China’s natural gas industry include small and distant proven reserves, lack of gas 
transport infrastructure, high cost relative to alternative fuels, and lack of coherent 
government policy towards the industry. 
 
In 2008, China had six import sources compared to one import source in 2006. However, 
most of the additional import sources are politically unstable which explains China’s 
relative poor performance on G4. China received its first-ever LNG cargo in mid-2006 
under a long-term contract with Australia. Australia remains China’s major source of 
LNG. Its second terminal in Fujian started receiving cargoes from Indonesia in 2008. 
Another regasification terminal in the Shanghai area started to import LNG from 
Malaysia in 2009. In the northern inland areas of China, natural gas supply is likely to 
come from Siberia, Turkmenistan, Sakhalin and Sakha.  
 
Of the seven sample countries, Taiwan ranked 3rd with a GSSI of 0.662. Its major 
weakness is on G3 due to a very limited amount of domestic gas production and indeed 
has very limited domestic energy resources. As Taiwan lacks sufficient domestic energy 
sources, it is almost totally dependent on energy imports. There is no coal and oil 
reserves and natural gas resources are limited at around 0.4 billion cubic metres in 2008. 
Its strength on G1 as having low gas intensity is because oil is by far the dominant fuel in 
Taiwan's energy mix. In 2008, Taiwan had to import around 96 per cent of its energy 
requirements. Domestic demand for natural gas was met almost entirely by LNG imports 
which grew by almost 10 per cent in 2008, more than 50 per cent of which come from 
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Indonesia and Malaysia. Taiwan also receives small amounts of LNG imports from 
Trinidad and Tobago, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Algeria, Egypt and Equatorial Guinea. To 
facilitate supply and expand the use of natural gas, Taiwan has completed transmission 
and distribution network along the country’s west coast, which includes main trunk 
pipeline and regional distribution stations. To diversify its LNG supply, Taiwan has 
signed a 25-year LNG purchase agreement with RasGas of Qatar and has been 
constructing a new LNG import terminal in Taichung to expand import capacity (IEA, 
2007; EIA, 2007b).  
 
Coming closely on 4th rank is Korea with G4 and G1 as its major strengths. To reduce the 
economy’s dependence on imported oil, Korea introduced LNG in the 1980s to power its 
natural gas-based city gas to the residential sector. Since then, natural gas use has grown 
rapidly. Korea relies on imported LNG for most of its natural gas, though it began 
producing a small quantity of natural gas from one offshore field in 2004. Korea is the 
second largest importer of LNG worldwide accounting for 16 per cent of total LNG 
imports in 2008. The bulk of Korea’s LNG imports come from a much diversified group 
of sources which explains its strength on G4. These import sources include Qatar, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Oman, with smaller volumes coming from Trinidad and 
Tobago, Algeria, Nigeria, Belgium, Egypt, Brunei Darussalam and Australia, and 
occasional spot cargoes from elsewhere. Korean natural gas demand is shared almost 
evenly between the electricity sector and the residential heating sector, with a smaller 
amount consumed in petrochemical plants. With demand growing at an average annual 
growth rate of 48 per cent between 2003 and 2008, Korea continues to sign contracts for 
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additional supplies, though most of the new LNG term contracts in the past few years 
have included more flexibility for the purchaser in terms of the ability to lower volumes 
if necessary. To ensure stable supply for gas, Korea is also increasing LNG storage 
capacity at its existing terminals (EIA, 2007a). 
 
Japan ranked 5th in terms of gas supply vulnerability in the event of a supply disruption. It 
registered a GSSI of 0.707. Japan’s security of supply profile is relatively weak on G2 
which is a measure of net import dependency, and G3 which is the ratio of domestic 
production to domestic consumption of natural gas. Like Korea, Japan does not have 
significant domestic natural gas reserves and production, and gas is imported in the form 
of LNG. Of the total primary energy consumption in 2008, approximately 16 per cent is 
imported natural gas. Japan’s demand for natural gas has been increasing rapidly at an 
average annual growth rate of 4.3 per cent between 1980 and 2008. This is due mainly to 
the revision of the Gas Utility Industry Law where there has been increased competition 
in the industry as market entry and prices have been deregulated. In 2008, Japan imported 
98 per cent of its gas requirements and domestic demand was met almost entirely by 
LNG. LNG imports into Japan comprised 41 per cent of total world LNG trade, which 
mostly come from Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Australia and Qatar. Natural 
gas is mainly used for electricity generation, reticulated city gas and industrial fuels. 
Since Japan has placed priority on the stable and secure supply of LNG, Japanese LNG 
buyers have been in general paying a higher price than buyers in Europe or the United 
States under the long-term take or pay contracts with rigid terms on volume and price. 
Japan lacks a national pipeline network which could interconnect its consuming areas. 
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The possibility of a significant disruption at one LNG terminal in Japan poses a potential 
supply vulnerability issue.  
 
Despite its strength on G3, Thailand is the second most vulnerable country in our sample 
in the event of a supply shock. Thailand is endowed with production and reserves of 
natural gas, about 94 per cent of which is found in the Gulf of Thailand. Supply sources 
of natural gas are both from domestic fields and piped imports from Myanmar, though 
LNG remains a long-term option for Thailand. Imports of LNG have been confirmed 
with the planned construction of a receiving terminal on the east coast of the country by 
2011, with supply coming from Iran. Additional supply of natural gas is also expected 
from the Malaysia – Thailand Joint Development Area (JDA) (EIA, 2007c). Thailand’s 
relative weakness in G4 is due to having only one source of imports with a very low 
political stability rating. Its economy’s high gas dependence in power generation is 
evident in its relative weakness in G1 which makes it vulnerable to supply shocks. 
Thailand uses 74 per cent of its natural gas supply for power generation and 70 per cent 
of its power comes from gas-based technology (Nakawiro and Bhattacharyya, 2007). 
Thailand’s high gas intensity is facilitated by a relatively well-established natural gas 
regulatory framework where third party access in gas transmission is quite developed and 
meant the existence non-discriminatory access to the gas transmission system based on 




Singapore is the most vulnerable country in our sample with a GSSI of 0.775. 
Singapore’s gas security of supply profile is relatively weak on G2 and G4 but more so on 
G3. The absence of domestic gas production combined with high domestic gas 
consumption makes Singapore relatively vulnerable to natural gas supply disruptions. Its 
consumption has risen rapidly in recent years owing mostly to government programs 
aimed at reducing carbon dioxide and sulphur emissions and encouraged the use of 
natural gas for power generation and petrochemical production (EIA, 2007d). In 2008, 
natural gas accounted for almost 15 per cent of Singapore’s total primary energy demand. 
Singapore relies entirely on imports to meet its natural gas requirements which are 
mainly used for power generation and petrochemical production. Around three quarters 
of Singapore’s fuel demand for electricity production come from natural gas. With gas 
representing such a large share of electricity production, diversification of supply is an 
important issue. Currently, all of Singapore’s piped natural gas imports come from 
Malaysia and Indonesia. However, the Energy Market Authority of Singapore is currently 
studying the viability of building an LNG import terminal, thereby freeing itself from 
dependence on neighbouring states for its natural gas supply. An agreement was also 
signed to supply LNG to the import terminal on Singapore's Jurong Island by 2012. 
 
Sensitivity of the GSSI to changes in values of the indicators. The analysis presented 
earlier highlights the sensitivity of the GSSI to the parameter values used. In particular, it 
is important in the evaluation of the GSSI to examine its sensitivity to changes in the 
values of the relative indicators of security of supply (φi’s) which in turn are based on the 
values of the Gi’s. Using 2006 data to calculate the values for G1, G2, G3 and G4 for the 
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same group of countries, it is interesting to note that there were no significant differences 
in the estimated values of the relative indicators (Table 2) and values of GSSIs to 
drastically change the relative vulnerability ranking of countries (Table 3). The constant 
relative ranking was not surprising despite strong growth trends in production, 
consumption and imports of natural gas from 2006 to 2008, particularly by China and 
India. As this growth trend generally occurred across all the Asian countries, its impact 
on the values of the relative indicators was minimal as it scaled the values in the same 
direction.  
 
Table 2.  The relative indicators of security of supply in selected net gas importing 
countries in Asia, 2006 (arranged in ascending order of vulnerability/insecurity) 
1ϕ  2ϕ  3ϕ  4ϕ  
Japan                  0. 000 China                   0.000 China                   0.000 Japan                   0.000 
China                  0.016 India                    0.117 India                    0.149 Korea                  0.202 
Taiwan                0.109 Taiwan                0.569 Thailand              0.245 Taiwan                0.646 
Korea                  0.155 Thailand              0.662 Taiwan                0.840 India                    0.734 
India                    0.202 Singapore            0.840 Japan                   0.968 Singapore            0..796 
Singapore            0.240 Korea                  0.961 Korea                  1.000 China                  1.000 
Thailand              1.000 Japan                   1.000 Singapore            1.000 Thailand              1.000 
AVERAGE         0.215 AVERAGE         0.519 AVERAGE         0.525 AVERAGE         0.571 
Source: Based on author’s calculations 
 
Table 3.  Gas security of supply index of selected net gas-importing countries in Asia, 
2006 and 2008 (arranged in ascending order of overall vulnerability/insecurity) 
2006 2008 
India 0.385 India 0.302 
China 0.500 China 0.394 
Taiwan 0.607 Taiwan 0.662 
Thailand 0.666 Korea 0.667 
Japan 0.697 Japan 0.707 
Korea 0.701 Thailand 0.761 
Singapore 0.768 Singapore 0.775 




An examination of the GSSIs for 2006 and 2008 of individual countries reveal 
noteworthy observations. Of the seven countries in the sample, only China and India 
experience a decline in their GSSIs from 2006 to 2008. This indicates a distinct 
improvement in the security of natural gas supply in China and India brought about by 
lower gas intensities, higher production and more diversified import sources. All the 
other Asian countries in the sample became more vulnerable in 2008 with their GSSIs 






Many factors determine gas vulnerability of an economy. Domestic production, gas 
efficiency usage, volume and sources of gas imports are very crucial in determining an 
economy’s vulnerability. The analysis in this paper highlights inter-country differences in 
individual and overall indicators of gas security which means that country differences 
exist with respect to vulnerability to natural gas supply disruptions. This implies that 
governments need to develop policy responses that directly address individual countries’ 
weaknesses to enable them to handle natural gas supply disruptions. Policy measures 
should reduce the probability of supply disruptions occurring and the costs of disruptions. 
For instance, India and China are relatively less vulnerable to supply disruptions 
compared to other countries in the sample because of their significant domestic gas 
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production and small share of gas in its energy mix. These meant that the two countries 
did not have to rely on gas imports for energy generation. 
 
Governments could implement various measures to better cope with supply disruptions 
and significantly mitigate their effects. For instance, gas import dependence has risks 
associated with price volatility, natural disaster, political blackmail and terrorism. 
Imported gas supplies are either pipeline bound or sea bound LNG. These transit options 
are both exposed to risks but it is the degree of having viable alternative options that 
defines security of supply. When gas imports depend dangerously on too few sources, it 
raises a concern whether this is compatible with a sensible policy goal of gas supply 
security. This concern is exacerbated when taking geopolitical considerations into 
account. Hence, diversification of gas import sources is encouraged. Other diversification 
measures include fuel-switching and diversifying energy mix. Diversification in fuel 
types and sources would reduce the costs of supply disruptions by spreading the risks 
across different import and energy sources. As Percebois (2006) and Reymond (2007) 
summed it, a country which imports the majority of its gas at a sustainable cost and 
ensures the security of supply by well-diversified and politically-stable sources will not 
be vulnerable. 
 
Governments also have the option of reducing overall gas dependence by improving gas 
efficiency through research and development and adoption of technologies that reduce 
gas consumption or increase the efficiency of gas use, technologies that facilitate gas 
exploration and production, and alternative processing technologies such as gas to liquids 
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plant. To enhance natural gas supply security, it is also important that investments in 
domestic gas exploration and production activities are encouraged though joint venture 
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The gas intensity of GDP of country j ( jG1 ) is measured as the ratio of total natural gas 
consumed in country j ( jGC ) to GDP of country j ( jGDP ) and expressed as cubic meter 
per unit of GDP or m3/GDP. The country’s output of goods and services is measured by 
inflation-adjusted GDP. 
 
The relative indicator for country j associated with 1G  ( j1ϕ ) is estimated as: 
 
( )








The relative indicator, j1ϕ  results in projection of jG1  in the interval [0, 1]. A low value 
of j1ϕ  means that country j is less vulnerable or less insecure to supply shocks compared 
to other countries in the study. 
 








The gas import dependency of country j ( jG2 ) is expressed as the ratio of net imports of 
natural gas in country j ( jGM ) to total primary energy consumption in country j 
( jTPEC ). Its unit is in percentage. 
 
Similarly, the relative indicator for country j associated with 2G  ( j2ϕ ) is estimated as:  
 
( )








The above adjustment transforms the indicator in the [0, 1] interval with the value of 0 
being assigned to the country with the lowest value of the selected security of supply 
indicator and least vulnerable and the value 1 is assigned to the country with the highest 
value of the selected indicator and hence most vulnerable.  
 





G LL =3  
 
where jGP  is domestic natural gas production in country j and jGC  is total natural gas 
consumed in country j. 
 
This indicator, unlike the first two, is negatively related to gas supply vulnerability or 
security. A high value for G3 means that country j is less vulnerable or less insecure to 
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supply shocks compared to other countries in the study. To accommodate this negative 
relationship, the relative indicator for country j associated with 3G  ( j3ϕ ) is estimated as:  
 
( )








The above adjustment transforms the indicator in the [0, 1] interval with the value of 0 
being assigned to the country with the highest value of the selected security of supply 
indicator and least vulnerable and the value 1 is assigned to the country with the lowest 
value of the selected indicator and hence most vulnerable.  
 
Geopolitical risk ( 4G )  
This is largely determined by the degree of diversification of gas import sources and the 
associated political stability of these sources. ECN (2004) has suggested a methodology 
for quantifying such risk using the adjusted Shannon diversity index. The following 
formula describes such index. 
( )∑−=
i
iii mmhS ln  
 where: 
S = Shannon index of import flows of gas, adjusted for political stability in 
exporting country i; 
hi = extent of political stability in exporting country i, ranging from 0 (extremely 
unstable) and 1 (extremely stable); and  
mi = share of gas imports from country i in total gas imports. 
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The relative indicator for country j associated with 4G  ( j4ϕ ) is estimated as: 
 
( )







Like j3ϕ , this indicator is negatively related to gas supply vulnerability or security which 
means that a lower value for G4 suggests high vulnerability to supply shocks or a worse 
gas supply situation (i.e., high insecurity). The above adjustment transforms the indicator 
in the [0, 1] interval with the value of 0 being assigned to the country with the highest 
value of the selected security of supply indicator and least vulnerable and the value 1 is 
assigned to the country with the lowest value of the selected indicator and hence most 
vulnerable.   
 
Appendix Table 1. Individual gas security of supply indicators for seven net-importing 
countries in Asia, 2008 (arranged in ascending order of vulnerability/insecurity) 

































































Source: Author’s computations 
 
Note: G1 = Gas intensity; G2 = Net gas import dependency; G3 = ratio of domestic gas production to total 
domestic gas consumption; G4 = geopolitical risk; 
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The data on GDP in 2008 were taken from World Economic Outlook Database (IMF, 
2009). Data for natural gas— domestic production, domestic consumption and trade 
movements in volume terms were taken from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
(2009). In this study, the percentile rank of an exporting country in the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators for political stability in 2008 was used to determine hi 
(Appendix Table 2).  
 
Appendix Table 2. Political risk rating of selected gas-producing countries (2008) 





















Trinidad & Tobago 47.8 
United Arab Emirates 72.7
United States 68.4 
Source: World Bank, 2009, Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2008, downloaded from 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp and 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/wgidataset.xls; Political risk ratings range from 0 for high 
risk to 100 for low risk. 
 
